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T

he U.S. policy on the South China Sea (SCS) has remained consistent
since its initial formulation in 1995 through today.
U.S. SCS Policy (1995).
Concerned that a pattern
of unilateral actions and reactions in the South China
Sea had increased regional
tensions, the Department
of State announced a new
U.S. Policy on Spratly Islands
and South China Sea on May
10, 1995. Four pillars
served as the basis for the
policy.

U.S. Policy on the South China Sea:
The Four Pillars (1995)
(1) Oppose the use or threat of force to resolve
competing claims.
(2) Intensify diplomatic efforts to resolve the
competing claims, taking into account the interests of all parties, and contribute to peace and
prosperity in the region.

U.S. Position on Mari(3) Maintain freedom of navigation by all ships
time Claims in the SCS and aircraft in the South China Sea.
(2020). In response to
continued Chinese malign (4) Take no position on the legal merits of the
behavior in the SCS, Secre- competing claims to sovereignty over the varitary of State Michael Pom- ous features in the South China Sea but view
peo announced on July 13, with serious concern any maritime claim or re2020, that the United striction on maritime activity in the South
States was strengthening China Sea that is inconsistent with international
its policy in the SCS to law, including UNCLOS.
make clear to China that its
“claims to offshore resources across most of the SCS are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them.” 1 The reinvigorated policy
seeks “to preserve peace and stability, uphold freedom of the seas in a manner consistent with international law, maintain the unimpeded flow of commerce, and oppose any attempt to use coercion or force to settle disputes.” 2
The new policy highlights that the rules-based international order has
come under an “unprecedented threat” from China. 3 In particular, China has
used “intimidation to undermine the sovereign [resource] rights of Southeast
Asian coastal states in the . . . [SCS], bully them out of offshore resources,
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assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with ‘might makes
right.’” 4
The U.S. position recalls that an Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under Annex VII of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, decided unanimously on
July 12, 2016 that China’s maritime claims in the SCS, including the NineDashed Line, have no basis in international law. 5 The new policy reiterates
that the Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on the Philippines and
China, and indicates that the United States aligns its position on China’s maritime claims in the SCS with the Tribunal’s decision. 6
U.S. Position on China’s Maritime Claims in the SCS (2020). The
United States takes the following positions on China’s SCS maritime claims.
1. The PRC cannot lawfully assert maritime claims derived from Scarborough Reef and the Spratly Islands, including an Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), “vis-à-vis the
Philippines in areas that the
Tribunal found to be in the
Philippines’ EEZ or on its continental shelf.” 7
2. China’s “harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development within those
areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral Chinese actions to exploit those resources.” 8
3. China “has no lawful territorial
or maritime claims to Mischief
Reef or Second Thomas Shoal, both of which fall fully under the Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction,” nor may China generate any territorial or maritime claims from these features. 9
4. The United States rejects any Chinese “claims to waters beyond a 12nautical mile (nm) territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the
Spratly Islands (without prejudice to other states’ sovereignty claims over
such islands).” 10
5. The United States rejects any Chinese “maritime claims in the waters
surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malaysia), waters in Brunei’s EEZ, and Natuna Besar (off Indonesia).” 11
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6. Any Chinese “action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters, or to carry out such activities unilaterally, is
unlawful.” 12
7. China has no lawful territorial or maritime claims to James Shoal, a submerged feature 50 nm from Malaysia. “An underwater feature like James
Shoal cannot be claimed by any state and is incapable of generating maritime zones.” 13
8. James Shoal “is not and never was Chinese territory, nor can China assert
any lawful maritime rights from it.” 14
9. The United States stands with its “Southeast Asian allies and partners in
protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with
their rights and obligations under international law.” 15
Status Quo on Territorial Sovereignty Claims. The new policy aligns the
U.S. position with the Tribunal’s rulings regarding China’s maritime claims.
It does not affect the U.S. position on SCS territorial claims reflected in the
Fourth Pillar of the 1995 policy statement other than to clarify that sovereignty claims may only be asserted over high-tide features. China may not
claim sovereignty over low-tide elevations, such as Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal, or totally submerged features, like James Shoal, which are
located within the EEZ or continental shelf of another nation. 16
The 2020 position reinforces the First Pillar of the 1995 policy by opposing China’s use or force to settle disputes and to impose “might makes
right” in the SCS or in the wider region. Finally, the new policy reiterates the
long-standing U.S. position, reflected in the Third Pillar of the 1995 policy,
that the United States will stand with the international community to defend
“freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty . . . in the SCS.”
Two days after the U.S. statement was released, Secretary Pompeo reiterated the need to intensify diplomatic efforts to resolve the competing
claims in the SCS. Consistent with the Second Pillar of the 1995 policy, Pompeo indicated that the United States would “support countries all across the
world who recognize that China has violated their legal territorial [and maritime] claims.” 17 Specifically, he stated that the United States would provide
States assistance using all the tools at its disposal, “whether that’s in multilateral bodies . . . [or] through legal responses.” 18
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